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SESKOAD— TR AINING TH E ELITE*
Charles Donald McFetridge
Indonesia is dominated by the military; the Armed Forces are dominated by the 
Arm y; the Army is dominated by graduates of Seskoad (Sekolah Staf dan Komando—  
Angkatan Darat), the Indonesian Army Staff and Command School.* 1 Begun in 1951, 
Seskoad has graduated over 3,000 students from a variety of regular and special 
courses. Among its alumni are President Soeharto, Vice-President Umar Wirahadi- 
kusumah. Minister of Defense and Security Poniman, Head of the MPR Amir Mach- 
mud, Minister of Political and Security Affairs Surono, Coordinating Minister for 
Social Welfare Alamsyah P ., Head of the State Audit Board Yusuf, and dozens of 
other important members of the government. 2 From their first day of class Seskoad 
students are told that they are "the future leaders of the Army and the nation,"3 4
a highly accurate statement. The present article will examine the Seskoad experi­
ence. By analyzing who is selected, how the selection process works, and what 
subjects are emphasized, the author hopes to provide a better understanding of the 
future leadership elite of Indonesia and also indicate the characteristics that the 
current leadership is seeking to perpetuate.
The Seskoad System
The Sesko system embraces the four branches of the Indonesian Armed Forces 
(A B R I), with each service. Arm y, Navy, A ir Force, and Police, having its own 
school. In addition, there is a Joint Staff College (Seskogab) which is a step up 
from the service schools (previous graduation from service school, Indonesian or 
foreign, is a requirement for selection).1* These schools are all in the Bandung-
* The views expressed here are solely the author's and do not reflect those of the 
US Arm y.
1. Interviews with Indonesian student officers affirm the view that Seskoad is more 
a leadership school than its counterparts in the other services which are seen as 
more "technical."
2. Over thirty Seskoad alumni have been promoted to at least junior minister status 
or higher. Another 160 have occupied posts of major importance in the military ser­
vices. Over eighty-five have been named secretary general,'director general, gov­
ernor, head of a national institute, or head of a nondepartmental government board. 
Many more are active in various civilian enterprises in leadership capacities. (Daf-  
tar Alumni Siswa Kursus Singkat Seskoad Sesko ABRI Bagian Darat [an undated 
compilation of alumni published by Seskoad in limited private edition, which includes 
classes 1951-82].)
3. Opening ceremony of Seskoad Regular Course 20 (1982-83), June 5, 1982.
4. Seskogab (Sekolah Staf dan Komando Gabungan) has a mixed student body from 
all the services. The course lasts six months. There are no foreign students. 
Graduates usually return to their previous postings.
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Lembang area, except the Navy branch (Jakarta), and are administered by a cen­
tral command headquarters. The National Defense Institute (Lemhannas), located 
in Jakarta, is the highest of the defense schools.5
Of the various schools, Seskoad is the most important, those of the A ir Force, 
Navy, and Police being smaller and more technical in their scope. The other three 
services do not have the broad national development mission of the Arm y, so they 
spend less time on social development and security subjects than does the Army 
school. Th e ir graduates are more easily absorbed into their respective services 
and into the comparatively few nonmilitary jobs ( karyawan) allocated them .6 While 
Seskogab and Lemhannas are more influential at the top of the national leadership 
pyramid, their small and exclusive enrollment limits their graduates to the top eche­
lons of the government in Jakarta. Seskoad has a much larger student body7 which 
is not entirely absorbed by the many headquarters in Jakarta, so that graduates 
are scattered throughout Indonesia and are influential in every location. In addi­
tion to the regular course, beginning in 1982 Seskoad is offering a second, the 
Army Staff and Administration Course (Sesminad). 8 The role and importance of 
this course have yet to be assessed, but it is generally deemed less prestigious 
than the regular one.
For many years Seskoad also functioned as the doctrinal development body, or 
"think tank," for the Arm y. Most of the basic ideas of national strategy and policy 
were formulated there in the late 1950s and early 1960s, before the advent of the 
other schools. This fact continues to lend prestige to Seskoad, although the school 
no longer performs this function. Seskoad also feeds the higher schools with stu­
dents, the majority of whom are Army officers. By virtue of its dominant position 
in the military community, Seskoad can currently claim to be the single most impor­
tant source of leaders in Indonesia.9
5. Lemhannas (Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional) has a mixed civilian/military student 
body. While foreign students are not admitted to the regular courses, "Special 
Courses" for foreign officers are occasionally conducted parallel to the main course, 
and these have been open to ASEAN representatives. Prior completion of a staff 
college is an entrance requirement. The percentage of combat arms officers in 
Lamhannas is lower than in the Sesko schools.
6. For a detailed account of karyawan jobs, see John A . MacDougall, "Patterns of 
Military Control in the Indonesian Higher Central Bureaucracy," Indonesia, 33 
(April 1982), pp. 89-121.
7. Seskoad averages about 150 students per year compared with sixty to seventy- 
five students in the other Seskos.
8. Sekolah Staf dan Administrasi Angkatan Da rat— Army Staff and Administration 
School. The other services have also begun administration and staff courses. 
Several women officers have been selected for these courses, apparently the first 
time women have been able to enter higher military schools.
9. In the future that distinction may be shared with the Armed Forces Military 
Academy (Akabri, Akademi Angkatan Bersenjata) at Magelang, Central Java. That 
institution graduated its first class in 1960 and supplies 85-90 percent of Seskoad 
students. These officers are still too junior to have moved into the uppermost eche­
lons of the leadership elite, but this is clearly only a matter of a few years. A l­
ready, officers of the "New Generation," i .e .,  commissioned after 1960, hold the 
majority of outer island Military District Commands (Kodam, Komando Daerah Mi li­
ter) . These commands are brigadier general billets. The new commander of Army 
Special Forces troops is also a Magelang graduate. By 1985, Magelang graduates 
expect to hold essentially all key subordinate command positions.
T A B L E  1
Percentage D istributio n  by Branch of S e rvice , 1980-83
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Branch 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 Average
Infantry 41.60 38.80 47.20 42.53
Artillery 11.80 17.10 15.30 14.73
Cavalry (Ta n k ) 6.20 3.80 6.90 5.63
Intendence (Supply) 6.20 1.90 1.40 3.17
Engineer 9.30 18.40 6.90 11.53
Signal 8.70 6.30 6.20 7.07
Ordnance 5.50 5.70 5.50 5.57
Adjutant General (admin) 3.10 3.20 1.40 2.57
Military Police 2.40 2.50 2.80 2.57
T  ransportation 1.80 1.90 2.10 1.90
Finance 1.80 3.80 4.20 3.27
Dental Corps 0.60 — — 0.20
Topographic Engineer 0.60 0.60 0.70 0.63
Judge Advocate General — 0.60 — 0.20
Source: Various Seskoad yearbooks ( Buku Kenang-Kenangan) , all published pri­
vately in Bandung from 1969 through 1982.
The goal of every ambitious Indonesian Army officer is to be selected for 
Seskoad. Candidates are chosen "by computer" from a list compiled from three 
sources: military area commanders' recommendations; officer efficiency reports; 
and competitive examinations. The examinations are held annually and are primari­
ly concerned with technical military subjects. While theoretically open to any offi­
cer with two years' service as a major, the nature of the examination ensures a 
high representation of the combat branches (infantry, artillery, and tanks), while 
the "professional" branches (dental, medical, and legal) are virtually unrepresent­
ed (see Table 1). No woman has ever graduated from the regular Seskoad course. 
Officers must be less than forty years old when selected.10 While not formalized, 
there is a tacit policy of recognizing service in East Timor through the selection 
process. This policy started in 1979 on the assumption that officers serving there 
did not have the opportunity for self-study and preparation that other officers had. 
Majors and lieutenant colonels with operational service in East Timor receive a v ir ­
tual waiver of the examination requirement.11
10. Some candidates may not be able to attend immediately upon selection and thus 
may be older than forty when they enter the school. They must, however, have 
been selected before that age. A waiver to the age limit criterion is possible but 
very rare. This prohibition does not apply to the Sesminad course, where many 
students are older.
11. Some students indicated this was the cause of a general deterioration in the 
test score averages of the Seskoad classes over the last three years. Test scores 
are not made public. The author estimates that approximately 50 percent of the 
1982-83 class had seen active service in East Tim or. This policy did not seem to 
cause great resentment or frustration among nonveterans of Tim -Tim , possibly be­
cause these students had been selected anyway.
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T A B L E  2
Estimated Percentage D istribution by Ethnic G ro u p , 1980-83
Ethnic Group 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83
Percentage 
of Total 
Indonesian 
Population *
Javanese 55.30 56.70 57.20 43.00
Sundanese 17.40 10.10 16.60 9.00
Batak/Tapanuli 9.90 3.80 5.50 1.00
Minahasa 2.40 1.30 3.40 1.00
Bugis 1.90 1.30 3.40 2.50
Madurese 1.20 — — 4.00
Balinese 1.20 0.60 1.30 2.00
Minangkabau 1.20 3.80 5.50 1.00
Palembang 1.20 3.20 1.30 1.00
Aceh 0.60 2.50 1.30 1.00
Makassar 0.60 — — 1.00
Others /Unknown 7.10 16.70 4.50 33.50
Source: Buku Kenang-Kenangan.
* Estimated from Nene Vreeland, et a l., Area Handbook for Indonesia 1975 (Wash­
ington, D .C . :  Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 87-107.
TA B LE  3
Percentage Distribution by Religion, 1980-83
Religion 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83
Percentage 
of Total 
Indonesian 
Population
Christian 24.20 Data 17.40 ± 5.00
Muslim 73.20 not 81.90 ± 90.00
Hindu 0.60 available 0.70 1.80-2.00
Source: Compiled from Buku Kenang-Kenangan, Seskoad class 1980-81, and an in­
dividual information sheet distributed to the 1982-83 class by the course administra­
tor's office.
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T A B L E  4
Estimated Percentage D istribution  b y Island G ro u p , 1980-83
Island 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83
Percentage 
of Total 
Indonesian 
Population *
Java 73.90 66.80 74.40 61.90
Sumatra 14.90 16.20 15.90 18.90
Sulawesi 6.10 3.20 5.40 7.00
Nusa Tenggara 1.80 0.60 1.30 5.70
Kalimantan 1.80 2.50 1.30 4.60
Maluku 0.60 — — 0.90
Irian Jaya — — — 0.80
Others/Unknown — 10.70 — —
Source: Buku Kenang-Kenangan.
* According to still unofficial data gathered in October 31, 1980 census, quoted in 
a fact sheet distributed in January 1983 to Seskoad students.
TA B LE  5
Percentage Distribution by Branch Specialty of Seskoad Students, 1972-77
Branch 1972-73 1974-75 1975-76 1976-77*
Infantry 27.70
Artillery 14.40
Cavalry (Tank) 14.40
Intendence (Supply) 1.20
Engineer 25.30
Signal 4.80
Ordnance 6.00
Adjutant General (admin)
Military Police 2.40
Transportation
Finance
Dental Corps
Topographic Engineer
Judge Advocate General
Medical Corps 3.60
20.20 31.00 33.30
19.00 11.50 13.30
15.40 12.60 8.90
— — 4.40
34.50 25.20 16.70
3.60 5.70 7.70
4.80 9.20 7.70
1.20 1.10 3.30
— 1.10 3.30
—
2.30
—
—
1.20
—
* First year of main eligibility of Military Academy graduates. See Table 1 for 
current distribution.
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A preliminary analysis of the student classes for the years 1980-83 shows some 
rather interesting contrasts (see Tables 1 -4 ). The average student is a Javanese, 
infantry lieutenant colonel of the Islamic faith, who graduated from the military 
academy fourteen to fifteen years previously.12 As such, he represents the domi­
nant ethnic and religious groups of Indonesia. There are, however, some anoma­
lies in this situation. Relative to their percentage of the total Indonesian popula­
tion (9 percent and 1 percent), Sundanese and Batak representation in the Seskoad 
student body is high— about 15 percent and 5 percent (see Table 2 ). There is a 
similar situation in the area of religion. While Christians constitute only 5-10 per­
cent of the entire population, they account for some 21 percent of the students (see 
Table 3). Christians in the student body tend to be Javanese Christians. Interest­
ing also are the groups underrepresented. While it is hardly surprising that there 
are no East Timorese and Irianese students,13 Maluku, Nusa Tenggara (Lesser Sun- 
das), and Kalimantan are also poorly represented (see Table 4 ). There are no 
fixed quotas for admission to the officer corps or Seskoad.
After being selected, the Indonesian student prepares himself and his family 
for the eleven-month course. Families are not officially permitted to join the stu­
dent at Seskoad. All the students live in the mess (wisma) and visit their families 
on weekends and holidays, if they obtain travel passes. There is a bed-check 
nightly at 10:00 PM. Officers previously assigned in the Bandung area may main­
tain their families in government housing, but they are still expected to "live in ." 
The impact of a situation where all students live in the mess is that there are v ir ­
tually no distractions or truancy and a total commitment to the Seskoad experience. 
Finally, each officer must get by financially on his basic pay and allowances (major 
= $200; lieutenant colonel = $250), as he is cut off from other "informal" income. 
Saving for Seskoad is essential.
The organization of the student body is designed to promote group conscious­
ness and facilitate consensus (musyawarah-mufakat) .  Although homework is almost 
a daily occurrence, these assignments are rarely turned in or evaluated, especially 
after the first two months. Homework problems are discussed in class, individual 
evaluation is done through quizzes, weekly tests, and semester final examinations.
The basic study unit is the kelompok (group) of three or four students. Three 
kelompok comprise a sindikat (syndicate) of ten or eleven students. The majority 
of class time is in sindikat discussion of homework assignments. Each kelompok 
presents and defends its solution to the sindikat and the patun (faculty supervisor). 
The "group" solution is usually the work of an individual member of the kelompok, 
who presents it, on behalf of his group, to the rest of the sindikat. Theoretically, 
however, this solution has been reached through group consensus. The discussions 
are often very detailed and open, with rank and experience no protection from
12. Prior to the time the first Magelang class became eligible to enter Seskoad, the 
student body was predominantly from the technical branches of the Army (especially 
Engineers) (see Table 5). These technical officers graduated from a technical offi­
cers' academy (now dissolved). They tended to be more competitive in examina­
tions, general education, and overseas schooling than regular officers from the 
Army officers' candidate school.
13. According to the faculty no East Timorese or Irians have even attended the 
academy. Private conversations indicate that East Timorese have not yet entered 
the officer corps, while there is only a token number of Irianese. Poor educational 
background is the standard reason given, although this may be only part of the 
problem. Several students indicated that efforts were being made to increase the 
number of East Timorese and Irianese students in the military academy.
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awkward questions. Each student is graded on his class participation, both during 
presentations and in questioning.
Occasionally three sindikat will be grouped into a kelas sedang (working class) 
of thirty to th irty-four students and two or three patun. The kelas sedang func­
tions like a very large sindikat. Solutions representing the sindikat consensus are 
presented, discussed, and defended there. The patun guides the discussion and 
usually summarizes the results. Lectures are given to the entire student class in a 
lecture hall or auditorium. Beginning in 1982-83, many of the formal lectures are 
given to the combined Seskoad-Sesminad classes. Question-and-answer periods are 
infrequently included in formal lectures.
The emphasis on group rather than individual effort is reinforced in the vari­
ous command post exercises, map problems, field trips, and surveys that are held. 
Seskoad lectures are long by Western standards. A normal lecture period is over 
six hours, with two or possibly three breaks, and lectures on some subjects, espe­
cially those of a philosophical nature, are even longer. It is by no means uncommon 
for a lecturer (or team) to address a subject from 7:30 AM until 5:20 PM, with a 
mid-morning and a lunch break of less than an hour. The attention span of all stu­
dents suffers predictably.
The Education Process
Having examined the structure and composition of the student body, it is logi­
cal next to examine the curriculum. As the Indonesian Army has gone to consider­
able trouble to assemble its "best and brightest" for Seskoad, it should be possible 
to discern by examining the subject matter of the courses there, what the current 
leadership believes is important— and what is not. It is useful to recognize that 
there is no shortage of class periods. Instruction periods are forty minutes long, 
and the class schedule runs from 7:30 AM until 4:00 PM Monday through Thursday; 
7:30 AM until 5:20 PM on Friday, with a three-hour midday break for prayers; and 
7:30 AM until 12:00 noon on Saturday. Almost every Friday night there are classes. 
Night classes are irregular but frequent. An average week of instruction would 
fill forty-six classroom hours. Special exercises, guest lectures, homework, night 
seminar discussions, and other projects increase this average. There is, then, 
over the full eleven months, ample time to explore any relevant subject or concept.
For the purpose of this analysis, I have divided the course curriculum into five 
groupings: Administration, Social Sciences, Military Theory, Practical Military Sub­
jects, and Nation Building. This division is arbitrary and is not that used by the 
school. Inevitably some subjects could be counted in more than one category, and 
with regard to two subject areas, in particular— "Operations within Indonesia" and 
"Territorial Development"— the relationship was too complex and interwoven for a 
clear distinction to be made. Class time devoted to these subjects accounts for 12 
percent of the course, and, as a best "solution," that 12 percent has been evenly 
split between the Nation Building category and Practical Military Subjects category 
(see below p. 94).
Administration of the course accounts for 6.3 percent or about 137 instruction 
periods, of forty minutes. Most of this time is used for tests, major examinations, 
and administrative briefings.
Social Science periods are an important part of the course, about 17.4 percent 
or 376 periods. A wide variety of topics are included in this category, such as 
Value T h e o ry ,1‘* Philosophy, Personal Communications, Ethics, and so on. Two 14
14. Value Theory ( Teori Nilai-nilai) classes examine the establishment of individual
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large sub-blocks are the week-long "Social Survey" and the weekly classes on either 
Japanese or Chinese language and culture. Civilian guest lecturers usually present 
these subjects, and the caliber of instruction varies, but is generally quite good.
As the majority of students have graduated from the military academy, much of the 
material in this section is relatively new to them. Because many Seskoad graduates 
will go on to positions in industry and the civil government, these subjects will 
broaden their background and nontechnical education. Many of these subjects "tie 
in" to subjects in the Nation Building category.
Military Theory is given a slightly larger share of the course, 18.4 percent or 
397 class periods. Topics in this group include Military Theory, Staff Procedures, 
and orientations on the other services (A ir  Force, Navy, and Police). The bulk of 
the time, however, is allocated to the routine, even tedious, aspects of staff pro­
cesses and formats, rather than to the very important studies, reports, estimates, 
and analyses on which one might logically expect effort to be concentrated. Mili­
tary Theory is the core of most higher military colleges. This is not the case at 
Seskoad as less than one-fifth of the total course time is spent on subjects in this 
category.
If Military Theory is the basis of military education. Practical Military Subjects 
are the "nuts and bolts." This is only partially true at Seskoad, where teaching 
tactics and conducting simulation exercises is limited to a rather modest 26.8 per­
cent of the course (706 periods). Even then, the total is as high as it is only be­
cause of the very lengthy map exercises which are the least intensive learning time 
of the course. The map exercises are frequently based on actual historical opera­
tions, although frequently fictionalized by using new names for familiar places. 
Critical analysis of these operations is not the main thrust of these exercises. In­
stead, the focal point is staff procedures. Much of the time is spent on civic action 
and territorial operations as they bear on the Indonesian concept of "People's De­
fense." As a result, only about three-fourths of the instruction periods can be 
clearly separated from nation building/developmental exercises.
The largest single block of instruction can be loosely termed Nation Building. 
Included here are Pancasila, the Constitution of 1945, the Government Five Year 
Development Plan, Territorial Development, and Operations. Over 32 percent (798 
periods) of time is devoted to these subjects. This does not, of course, include 
oblique references and discussions that frequently surface in subjects far afield 
from Nation Building. Such an emphasis is hardly surprising. Given the Army's 
historical background and its many extramilitary responsibilities, a thorough and 
firm grounding in the national plans, goals, and philosophy is essential. Overlap­
ping lectures and speeches repeat the message in detail. The Indonesian graduate 
is thus thoroughly exposed and, presumably, committed to the government pro­
grams designed to support the national philosophy of Pancasila.
A quick analysis of the curriculum reveals that the Army Staff and Command 
College teaches purely military subjects less than 50 percent of the time. Some of 
the reasons for this are self-evident. The remainder of this paper will suggest 
some possible causes and results of this situation.
Goals and Objectives
It is the stated goal of Seskoad to prepare mid-level Army officers for positions 
of higher responsibility by teaching leadership, professionalism, and the Dual *
and group value systems, the competition between and mutual reinforcement of dif­
ferent value systems, and the importance of fostering certain values and principles 
in the development of the nation.
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Function of the Armed Forces. The first two goals are common to any military col­
lege in the world. The Dual Function concept ( Dwi Fungsi) is a bit more unusual. 
The Dual Function concept is too complex to be analyzed here, but generally may 
be said to embody the duty of the Armed Forces to assist in the development of the 
country in a wide variety of ways in virtually every field of government. The 
Seskoad course is designed to prepare officers for command and staff positions 
throughout the upper echelons of the Army and government.
Seskoad, however, has other implied objectives. The first of these may be 
called national unity. The Indonesian Army has not forgotten that the majority of 
its virtually uninterrupted combat operations have been against people who were, 
at least nominally, Indonesian. Loyalty to the nation, as represented by the gov­
ernment in Jakarta, has been a factor in every campaign, with the arguable excep­
tion of the Confrontation with Malaysia.15 Of these disturbances, the most serious 
and dangerous have been led by disaffected military personnel (including the G30S/ 
PKI attempted coup in 1965).
A second implied objective is the reinforcement of the web of personal relation­
ships. The forced cooperation, at all levels, and the formation of friendships based 
on that cooperation, is very important. The faculty officer responsible for student 
affairs has said that "cooperation and learning to function as a group" was the key 
to success "in the school and later" (emphasis added). In short, this is where one 
of the "old-boy networks" is formed, and formed quite deliberately. This process 
occurs to some extent at all staff colleges, but is greatly facilitated at Seskoad. It 
also complements the Army's efforts to break up the regional cliques that previously 
played such an important role in military and national politics. Regular changes of 
commanders and careful selection have largely broken up these historically strong 
associations.16 Since almost all generals are Seskoad alumni, it is perhaps natural 
that they assume an elitist outlook.
15. One can stretch the point by arguing that since 1945, the central government 
has been fighting continuously, at some level, against separatist rebels or "disloyal" 
elements of the nation. A summary of these events follows:
Time Place
1945-50 Java, Sumatra, some outer 
islands
1948 Madiun, Central Java
1950 Bandung, West Java, Ambon, 
Makassar, Maluku
1948-60 West Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi
1956-61 Sumatra, Sulawesi, Kalimantan
1962-63 Irian Barat
1963-66 Kalimantan
1965-68 Indonesia
1969-? Irian Barat
1975-? East Timor
1968-? West Kalimantan
Remarks
Revolutionary War. Many Indonesians in 
the Dutch Indies Arm y.
Communist Revolt.
Westerling affair— ex-K N IL soldiers 
revolt.
Darul Islam/TII fanatic Muslim revolt. 
PRRI-Permesta separatist revolt. 
Irridentist annexation campaign against 
Dutch and local forces.
Confrontation with Malaysia to permit its 
people to join Indonesia if they wanted to. 
Communist attempted coup and ensuing 
anti-Communist campaign.
Free Papua Movement guerrilla warfare. 
Integration of East Timor and anti- 
Fretelin campaign.
Anti-Communist campaign along Indone- 
sian-Malaysian border.
16. The complex and shifting pattern of alliances and cliques is a subject that 
could fill a book(s). The historic power groupings along the lines of the Siliwangi,
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Another objective, unstated but apparent, is the testing and examination of the 
prospective elites in a competitive environment. At one time all students would re­
place their actual rank insignia with special, identical Seskoad rank badges. A l­
though this system has been abandoned, it is an indication of Seskoad's commitment 
to stimulating and open discussion, regardless of a student's rank. Considering the 
exaggerated deference paid to rank outside the school, the extent to which a stu­
dent is willing to question his superior's conclusions is remarkable. The discus­
sions, where the students are expected to support and defend their positions, are 
usually conducted using the term Pak and the nickname rather than the more formal 
Pak Letnan Kolonel (or Mayor) and the full name. Athletic competitions at the 
school are also "rank free," with each student competing equally. Other benefits 
derive from mixing the officer corps at Seskoad. Many students have previously 
had a very narrow range of assignments and experiences, and some have served 
many years in remote areas.17 Seskoad brings these officers back into the main­
stream of the Arm y, and allows an otherwise rare sharing of experiences.
The Seskoad experience is also interesting for the subjects that are not em­
phasized or, indeed, even included. Inevitably this involves a comparison with 
other staff colleges. The Indonesian Army has a wealth of foreign college gradu­
ates, well aware of the differences between overseas schools and Seskoad. A pro­
portion of the top leadership echelons of the Armed Forces have received foreign 
military schooling.18 There is no doubt, then, that the differences in curriculum 
and methods are deliberate and have been well thought out. Certainly they have 
not been resorted to because of lack of time. Subjects taught are taught exhaus­
tively.
There is a surprising lack of emphasis in some areas that would be considered 
basic in other staff colleges. Foremost among these is the disinterest in individual 
analysis and original professional writing. Formal written requirements are few and 
the scope generally limited.19 Professional journals publish articles, but these tend 
to be translations of general articles appearing in Western journals or magazines. 
Citation of sources and references is often sketchy. The more original, indigenous
Diponegoro, and Brawijaya divisions are no longer a major factor below the rank of, 
perhaps, lieutenant colonel. This means there is no longer a power base, although 
the older officers may still maintain contacts along the old lines. These would more 
properly be considered personal/nostalgia groups rather than self-perpetuating 
cliques. The Kopassandha (Komando Pasukan Sandi Yudha— Special Forces Com­
mand) and the Lfnud (Lintas Udara— Airborne) elements of Kostrad (Komando Stra- 
tegi Angkatan Darat— Army Strategic Command) have some group loyalty because of 
their repetitive assignments, their natural elitism, and their lack of territorial ties. 
Probably neither group has anything like the influence of the Siliwangi Division in 
the 1950s and early 1960s.
17. One Javanese student proudly proclaimed he had spent thirteen straight years 
in Irian Jaya.
18. This includes General Widodo, retired Army Chief of Staff who is an alumnus
of the American Army Command and Staff College, and the current deputy command­
er of Seskoad, Brigadier General Hendrato.
19. In October 1982, then Minister of Defense and Security, General M. Yusuf, 
addressed a joint session of all four Bandung area staff colleges. This address, 
not open to foreign students, directed a study of twelve subjects to be done by 
each student. These subjects have not been made public. It appears this was a 
one-time only, totally unexpected, exercise.
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articles are also, almost exclusively, general treatments of broad subjects such as 
Pancasila or National Strategy.
While development and modernization are stressed, historical lessons (both 
political and military) receive the briefest treatment. Even now there are virtually 
no professional articles on the activities in East Tim or, lessons learned from joint 
exercises, or case studies of previous successful or unsuccessful operations. This 
may well increase the likelihood of recurring problems. The intellectual ferment 
that often characterizes military staff colleges is largely absent, a situation high­
lighted by the tiny library which actively subscribes to no foreign military journals 
and is closed except during student class hours, thus making it largely unavailable 
to the students.
Another void in the education process is the "nonevent." Many books, docu­
ments, and articles can be obtained on certain aspects of Indonesian military his­
tory, including the Revolution, the PRRI-Permesta rebellions, and the 30 Septem­
ber attempted coup. Other events are almost undocumented. These include the 
Malaysian Confrontation, the ongoing rebellion in Irian Jaya, and the military as­
pects of the integration of East Timor into Indonesia. To what extent such informa­
tion is circulated in classified briefings and classes is not known. If there are 
relevant documents available on these subjects, they are not available to the public.
Perhaps the most significant subject area that is underemphasized is any close 
study of the formation and implementation of national policy. On the philosophical 
and semantic level there is considerable discussion, but on the practical or compara­
tive level there is none. The study of problems concentrates on defining and de­
scribing situations. Solutions, if introduced, are polemical and very general.
Conclusions
The Indonesian student at Seskoad is exposed to a wide variety of subjects, 
both civil and military, but is not always required to assimilate or demonstrate 
understanding of many of these. This is true of numerous staff colleges through­
out the world, but most of these do not have the Dual Function mission assigned to 
the Indonesian Arm y.
Confidence, both self-confidence and mutual confidence, is an important by­
product of Seskoad training. Each officer must present and defend his solutions 
to various types of problems. Fellow students criticize these solutions. These 
give-and-take sessions occur daily and constitute the only feedback a student re­
ceives. Tests, quizzes, and all other written work are never returned or reviewed.
The educational system used produces a unified outlook and commonality of ap­
proach among the graduates. In a country of limited communications and facilities, 
this is undoubtedly beneficial. The ability of the constituent parts of the Republic 
to function in the event of war or natural disaster and do so without extensive cen­
tral coordination could be crucial to the nation's survival. The price, however, 
may be a loss of initiative and creativity. The unified outlook also ensures that the 
informal alliance system will continue to flourish.
The importance of Seskoad as a source of future leaders is unquestioned. 20 
Most of the top echelons of the Army and government, as alumni themselves, are
20. General Poniman, Minister of Defense and Security, and General Rudini, Chief 
of Staff of the Arm y, made such remarks to the graduating class of 1983. The 
Chief of Army Personnel personally handed each graduating officer his assignment 
orders in a ceremony separate from the actual graduation.
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familiar with the present system. Analysis of the course content shows it has been 
designed to complement and reinforce the current government structure. Seskoad 
is designed to produce loyal, reliable leaders with a clear understanding of, and 
commitment to, the current system of government. Divisiveness, introspection, 
and self-criticism of the system are not encouraged. The goal is to produce a fu­
ture generation of leaders with the same core values as the present leadership elite. 
Time will tell how effective this process has been.
